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Finding the Jury: State Legislative Responses
to Blakely v. Washington
The United States Supreme Court created turmoil in the
criminal justice world in June 2004 by declaring that cer-
tain long-accepted practices for sentencing criminal
defendants violated the Constitution. In Blakely v. Wash-
ington,2 the Court struck down important provisions of the
guidelines that established criminal sentences in the state
of Washington. Many other states immediately recognized
that their systems would likely be affected by the ruling. In
the months following the decision, much discussion
revolved around doomsday scenarios in which entire state
sentencing structures would have to be rebuilt from the
ground up. Justice O'Connor, in her dissenting opinion in
Blakely, predicted that the ruling would trigger the end to
"over 20 years of sentencing reform"3 and with it the gains
to fairness and efficiency those policies created in many
states.
A funny thing has happened, however, on sentencing
reform's trip to the dustbin of history. Despite dire predic-
tions, enormous national attention, and the demise of
federal sentencing guidelines at the hands of a subsequent
Supreme Court case, Blakely's principal consequence in a
majority of affected states appears not to have hastened
the eradication of sentencing innovations. Rather, the case
appears to have strengthened many officials' resolve to
preserve their existing sentencing structures. Perhaps to
the surprise of many, the policy changes that have
emerged in a number of statehouses are notable for their
efforts to minimize Blakely's impact by appealing to
notions of fairness, proportionality, and political legiti-
macy.
Blakely in a Nutshell
To understand how states have responded (and in some
cases, still are responding) to Blakely, it may first be help-
ful to rehearse briefly the highlights of the decision. Like
other jurisdictions, Washington employs sentencing
guidelines that establish the presumptive sentences a
judge must impose in typical cases.4 The guidelines are
based principally on the seriousness of the offense and the
defendant's criminal history. Like other state systems
prior to Blakely, Washington also permitted a judge to
impose an aggravated or enhanced sentence-a sentence
longer than the one established by the guidelines-if he or
she determined one or more factors existed to support an
extended sentence. Deliberate cruelty on the part of the
defendant is one typical aggravating factor.
In Blakely, the Supreme Court invalidated the provi-
sions of Washington's guidelines that allowed a judge
alone to make the factual findings necessary to impose
such an aggravated sentence. The Court ruled that when
the law sets a presumptive sentence for an offense, the
Sixth Amendment's right to trial by jury prohibits a judge
from imposing a longer sentence if based on a fact deter-
mined solely by the judge. The only exception relates to
prior criminal convictions. Any other fact must be admit-
ted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.
While Washington was the only state directly involved
in the case, the decision had wide implications for other
jurisdictions. Twelve additional states-Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Indiana, Minnesota, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, and Ten-
nessee-employed similar sentencing systems. Though
not all favored a guidelines-based approach, all thirteen
states established presumptive sentences for offenses
(sentences trial courts were required to apply in most
cases) and allowed judges to impose longer sentences
based on judicially determined facts. It was in these
states-and perhaps in several voluntary sentencing
guideline systems as well-that justice O'Connor and
many others presumed the Blakely decision threatened to
change everything, forcing significant alterations to how
these jurisdictions approached criminal sentencing. For
the most part, it has not turned out this way, as can be
seen by the policy responses states have embraced and
rejected.
How Have States Responded?
In the immediate aftermath of Blakely, both supporters
and opponents of presumptive sentencing systems offered
competing options for modifying state sentencing regimes
to comply with the Court's decision. Some, like the com-
plete abandonment of presumptive sentences, would
require significant changes to foundational philosophies
and procedures of criminal sentencing in certain states.
Others would involve fewer changes to procedure but
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would demand a shift in the underlying principles of sen-
tencing. One such proposal involves transforming
presumptive sentences that judges are required to follow
into purely advisory recommended sentences; another is
the adoption of "topless" guidelines, where a recom-
mended minimum term is established by law and judges
may impose sentences as lengthy as the maximum term
authorized by an underlying criminal statute.
In sorting through the options, states appear to have
favored one particular proposition above all others: the
preservation of presumptive sentencing and of aggravated
sentences but with the notable new twist of jury fact-find-
ing. This addition means asking juries-not judges-to
find beyond a reasonable doubt the facts required to jus-
tify an aggravated sentence. So far, six of the thirteen
states affected by Blakely--Alaska, Arizona, North Car-
olina, Minnesota, Oregon, and Washington-adopted jury
fact-finding in the 2005 legislative session.5 Three addi-
tional states-Colorado, Indiana, and New
Mexico-proposed but failed to pass bills adopting this
solution.6 Jury fact-finding as a response to Blakely allows
states to continue to adhere to the principles on which
their systems were based and to do so with minimal
changes to sentencing procedures. States may be turning
to this approach in part because a workable model of such
a solution was already in place in Kansas.
Many have pointed to the Kansas model as the easiest
solution to comply with Blakely while preserving the struc-
ture of presumptive sentences. After the Kansas Supreme
Court invalidated that state's sentencing guidelines sys-
tem in 2ooI,7 the legislature chose to retain presumptive
guidelines by incorporating jury fact-finding as the basis
of any aggravated or "enhanced" sentence.8 Kansas's expe-
rience has provided guidance for states affected by Blakely.
Under the revised system, Kansas prosecutors must file a
motion thirty days before trial if they wish to seek an
enhanced sentence above the guidelines presumptive sen-
tence. The judge then decides whether, in the interests of
justice, the evidence of enhancing factors must be pre-
sented to a jury at a post-trial sentencing hearing or as part
of the prosecution's case at trial. If the jury unanimously
finds that a factor has been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, the judge nonetheless retains the discretion to sen-
tence within or beyond the guidelines presumptive
sentence.
A number of elements came together to make jury fact-
finding feasible in Kansas. Importantly, enhanced
sentences have been a historical rarity in Kansas. Most
sentences are reached through plea negotiations, a process
that decreases the opportunity to impose aggravated sen-
tences. In addition, penalties are already stiff for many of
the violent offenses where an aggravated sentence might
be most warranted. No formal evaluation has been com-
pleted, but anecdotal evidence from judges, prosecutors,
and defense attorneys indicates that jury fact-finding is
infrequently employed, and when it is, the procedure does
not place significant additional burdens on the system.
Finally, Kansas statutes afford judges great latitude in
imposing consecutive sentences, which allows a judge to
impose long sentences without jury fact-finding.
This straightforward approach may also be driving
other states. In the four sentencing guidelines states
adopting jury fact-finding-Minnesota, North Carolina,
Oregon, and Washington-sentences above the presump-
tive guidelines sentence occur infrequently. In
Washington, for example, only 3 percent of all sentences
imposed in 2004 (841 sentences) were above the sentence
recommended by guidelines.9 In the other three guide-
lines states, such departures occur in just 6 to 8 percent of
cases annually.0 Thus, jury fact-finding may impose a
manageable burden in these states because it only
becomes a possibility in a limited number of cases. In
Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Indiana and New Mexico, the
five non-guidelines states adopting or proposing jury fact-
finding, it is unclear how many sentences are imposed
above presumptive sentences. There is some indication
that policy makers have considered the potential impact of
an increase in jury trials in their decision to adopt or pro-
pose jury fact-finding.
In Alaska, for example, officials decided to modify
slightly the underlying structure of their presumptive sen-
tencing scheme to accommodate jury fact-finding. Under
Alaska law, statutes established single, presumptive sen-
tence terms for different groups of offenses. A judge was
required to impose these terms and could impose a longer
sentence only after finding aggravating factors. Recently
adopted legislation establishes a series of presumptive
ranges-rather than single presumptive terms-for differ-
ent groups of offenses and allows a judge to impose any
sentence within the new range. The law also allows the
court to go above the presumptive range after a finding of
fact by the jury. Minnesota adopted a similar change,
widening the presumptive sentence ranges for offenses
within its sentencing guidelines. According to the Min-
nesota Sentencing Commission, which drafted the
changes, the wider ranges were intended to create greater
flexibility for the courts in determining an appropriate
sentence and to reduce the need for jury determination of
aggravating factors." If wider ranges prove inadequate to a
particular case, jury fact-finding would be available.
While jury fact-finding emerged as the most popular
response among most states, it was not the only solution
proposed. In Washington and Colorado, competing bills
were introduced in response to Blakely. In both jurisdic-
tions, one proposal would have converted presumptive
sentences into a voluntary regime, while another sought to
incorporate jury fact-finding into the existing presumptive
scheme. In Washington, for example, the voluntary pro-
posal would not have changed the guidelines structure
and sentence recommendations, but it would have made
them advisory, allowing judges to impose any sentence
above that recommended by the guidelines without having
to base that decision on a finding of fact.- (Since Blakely,
the Supreme Court has made it clear that such voluntary
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systems do not encounter Sixth Amendment problems.3)
The competing Washington bill adopting jury fact-finding,
however, was passed by the legislature. This bill preserved
the underlying structure of Washington's guidelines sys-
tem and likely represented to many policy makers the
Blakely response most proportionate to the need for
change.'4
The results in Colorado were quite different-neither
of the competing bills in the state came to a vote in the
general assembly. A Senate bill proposed converting the
presumptive sentence range for each felony class into a
"suggested range" and allowing a judge to impose any
sentence in the higher aggravated sentencing range for
each felony class.'S The bill was assigned to the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary and consideration by the
Committee was "postponed indefinitely." A competing bill
in the House would have created jury fact-finding for sen-
tences above the presumptive range (i.e., in the aggravated
range) for each felony class., 6 The House bill was similarly
assigned to the House Committee on the Judiciary, and no
action was taken on it before the end of the legislative ses-
sion.
Other states similarly did not see the preservation of
presumptive sentences in the same favorable light. In
addition to Colorado, three other states-Indiana, New
Mexico, and Tennessee-have so far chosen not to adopt
jury fact-finding in response to Blakely. Rather, Ten-
nessee and Indiana have abandoned the presumptive
nature of their systems altogether, making recom-
mended sentences voluntary rather than presumptive. 7
New Mexico, like Colorado, failed to pass legislation to
make any changes to their sentencing structure. How-
ever, in New Mexico, the state Supreme Court ruled that
the state's sentencing system is unaffected by Blakely;
the Colorado Supreme Court reached the opposite con-
clusion, holding that Colorado's structure ran afoul of
Blakely.18 Since the Colorado decision specified no
immediate remedy, the state is left without a solution to
their Blakely problems.
Policy makers in Tennessee, as in the other guidelines
states previously discussed, may have considered the feasi-
bility of jury fact-finding in adopting a response. While it
is unclear how many sentences are imposed above those
recommended by the state's presumptive sentencing
guidelines, concerns were raised that should the state opt
for jury fact-finding, the number could be large enough to
result in a high number of jury trials. The Governor's Task
Force on the Use of Enhancement Factors in Criminal
Sentencing-which proposed the switch to a voluntary
system-noted that jury fact-finding could "increase serv-
ice time of jurors, increase jury trial time on the court
docket, impose increased burdens on public defenders
and district attorneys and otherwise increase the costs of
the administration of justice."' 9
By contrast, in Indiana, the conversion to a voluntary
system was not necessarily policy makers' first choice. The
Indiana Senate initially passed a bill proposing the adop-
tion of jury fact-finding. However, the House Committee
on Courts and Criminal Code amended the bill to make
the presumptive sentencing terms currently established in
the Indiana code advisory. Under the amended bill, which
was signed by the governor, the state retained the recom-
mended terms for each offense. However, these terms
became advisory, permitting the court to impose any
longer sentence without a finding of fact.20
The New Mexico House similarly proposed the adop-
tion of jury fact-finding.21 While the bill passed the
House by unanimous vote, the legislation failed to reach
the Senate floor for a vote before the end of the legisla-
tive session. However, as noted above, such a legislative
solution is now unnecessary in light of the New Mexico
Supreme Court's decision finding the state's sentencing
system unaffected by Blakely. As a result of the Court's
ruling, New Mexico's sentencing scheme is now volun-
tary.
In three states-California, New Jersey, and Ohio-
policy makers have not proposed any legislative changes to
the state's sentencing procedures. In Ohio, legislators
appear to be waiting for the state high court to rule on the
applicability of Blakely to its system before introducing leg-
islative fixes. In New Jersey, the state Supreme Court has
recently ruled that the state's sentencing system is affected
by Blakely and itself fashioned a remedy that allows judges
to impose sentences up to the maximum allowed by the
underlying range provided by law.22 The Supreme Court
in California, however, reached a contrary conclusion,
holding that the state's determinate sentencing regime
was not affected by Blakely.23
Why Are States Preserving the Presumptive Structure?
Most of the states' responses discussed here indicate a
desire to preserve current sentencing structures by modi-
fying procedures for imposing sentences rather than
discarding presumptive sentencing structures entirely.
Why is this happening?
While no state model is perfect, most states intent on
preserving their systems likely have some confidence in
the ability of those mechanisms to achieve particular
sentencing goals, such as reducing unwarranted sen-
tence disparities, enhancing the predictability of
correctional resource needs, and establishing balance
and proportionality among sentences. These reasons are
likely most applicable to states with sentencing guide-
lines, which often are created with such policy outcomes
in mind.
As the Minnesota Sentencing Commission noted in its
recommendations for a response to Blakely, "The sentenc-
ing guidelines [have] served as the sentencing model in
Minnesota for over 20 years, focusing on uniformity, pro-
portionality and certainty in sentencing, while ensuring
fair and equitable sentences for all offenders regardless of
gender, race or geographic location."24 States are reluctant
to give up systems that achieve-or at least strive for-
these goals. Indeed, the presumptive structures in many
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states have great political and popular legitimacy. Preserv-
ing the presumptive nature of their systems through jury
fact-finding speaks to the belief that such systems achieve
the state's goals better than the alternatives.
The systems in states that have abandoned or contem-
plated abandoning their presumptive sentencing
structures may not engender the same confidence or may
not enjoy substantial political and popular authority. Yet, it
is interesting to note that no state discussed here is
entirely rejecting the idea of recommended sentences.
Even the embrace of voluntary sentencing recommenda-
tions appears to reflect some confidence in their ability to
achieve sentencing goals. In Tennessee, the governor's
task force noted that the adoption of voluntary sentencing
guidelines was "calculated at maintaining the uniformity,
consistency and predictability of sentencing in Tennessee
without incurring the additional cost and burdens of [jury
fact-finding]." 2 5
Some practical balancing is also taking place in craft-
ing possible solutions. In several states-such as
Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, and Washington-
where very few sentences were regularly imposed above
the presumptive sentences, a modest response to intro-
duce jury fact-finding may well be most appropriate to
address Blakely's requirements. In Indiana and Ten-
-nessee-where historically, a majority of sentences appear
to have been imposed above the presumptive sentences-
the more drastic response of changing the fundamental
nature of sentencing philosophy may be a more practically
appropriate reaction than the creation of jury fact-finding.
Other states-such as Alaska, Arizona, California, Col-
orado, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Ohio-are likely
engaging in a similar balancing act.
Does a Strong Sentencing Commission Matter?
Immediately after the Blakely opinion was issued, sentenc-
ing commissions in several states sprang into action. With
dedicated staff and proficiency in evaluating the impact of
case law and legislation, sentencing commissions were
well-suited to determine quickly the impact of Blakely on
states' criminal justice systems. Indeed, states' responses
to Blakely may be partially identified by the recommenda-
tions put forth by these commissions. States with strong
commissions appear to be crafting solutions that maintain
their presumptive sentencing structures. The Minnesota
Sentencing Commission, for example, submitted a report
to the governor just six weeks after the Blakely decision
clearly describing the many ways the decision affected the
state and highlighting procedural changes required in
response.26 Based on an extensive evaluation, the Com-
mission later recommended the adoption of jury
fact-finding and the expansion of guidelines ranges-rec-
ommendations proposed in the House and Senate without
amendment. The sentencing commissions in New Mexico
and North Carolina weighed in with similar reports and
recommendations prior to the proposal of jury fact-finding
in each jurisdiction. 27
While the presence of a strong sentencing commission
may not guarantee the preservation of a presumptive sen-
tencing scheme, the absence of such a commission may
lead more directly to abandoning the presumptive nature
of the system. The three states seeking to abandon their
presumptive systems-Colorado, Indiana, and Ten-
nessee-all lack a strong sentencing commission. Indeed,
none has a continuing entity within state government that
serves the same deliberative, analytical, and policy-recom-
mending functions as a sentencing commission.
Conclusion
The surprise of Blakely is that most states are not throwing
out their presumptive sentencing regimes or even drasti-
cally altering the underlying structures of their systems in
response to the Court's ruling. Given the significant
investment in constructing these systems and their per-
ceived success in achieving their goals, many policy
makers appear reluctant to dispose of them. Rather, states
are searching for responses proportional to the actual chal-
lenge presented by Blakely and that speak to the political
and popular legitimacy of such presumptive sentencing
systems.
Whether the attention lavished on Blakely has whetted
the appetites of other states to evaluate and restructure
their sentencing systems has not been definitively
answered. There are stirrings of interest in some states,
but no ambitious reforms have been launched that were
not already under way a year ago. Those who are
intrigued, however, might want to pay attention to those
states that responded to the Court's decision by preserving
the fundamental characteristics of their systems. Systems
worth preserving may also be worth examining and, per-
haps, emulating.
State Responses to Blakely
Alaska-SB 56 signed by governor 3/23/05; creates new
presumptive sentence ranges in place of single presump-
tive terms for each felony class; creates jury fact-finding for
sentences above the presumptive sentence ranges.
Arizona-HB 2522 signed by governor 4/i/o5; creates
jury fact-finding for sentences above the single presump-
tive term for each felony class.
California-No legislative response.
Colorado-SB 215 assigned to Senate Committee on
the Judiciary 4/27/05, consideration postponed indefi-
nitely; converts the presumptive range for each felony
class into a "suggested range" and allows the court to
impose any sentence up to the statutory maximum sen-
tence for each felony class.
Colorado-HB 1327 assigned to House Committee on
the Judiciary 4/19/04, no action; creates jury fact-finding
for sentences above the presumptive range for each felony
class.
Indiana-SB 96 signed by governor 4/25/05; converts
the presumptive term for each felony class into advisory
terms and allows the court to impose any sentence up to
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the statutory maximum sentence for each felony class
without a finding of facts or a stating of reasons.
Minnesota-HF i signed by governor 6/2/05; creates
jury fact-finding for sentefices above the presumptive sen-
tencing guidelines range and creates wider sentence
ranges in each guidelines cell.
New Jersey-No legislative response; State v. Natale
(084 N.J. 458, 878 A.2d 724) declared the state's sentenc-
ing system unconstitutional under Blakely.
New Mexico-HB 694 failed to reach Senate floor
before end of legislative session; creates jury fact-finding
for sentences above the single presumptive term for each
felony class.
North Carolina-HB 822 signed by governor 6/30/05;
creates jury fact-finding for sentences above the guidelines
presumptive sentence range in each cell.
Ohio-No legislative response; State v. Foster and State
v. Quinones pending before the Ohio Supreme Court.
Oregon-SB 528 signed by governor 7/7/05; creates
jury fact-finding for sentences above the presumptive sen-
tencing guidelines range.
Tennessee-SB 2249/HB 2262 signed by governor
6/7/05; converts the presumptive sentencing guidelines
into voluntary sentencing guidelines.
Washington-SB 5477 signed by governor 4/15/05;
creates jury fact-finding for sentences above guidelines
presumptive range.
Legislative Responses
State No Action Jury Voluntary Alters
Fact-Finding Sentences Recommended
Sentences
Alaska
Arizona
California
Colorado" s
Indiana
Minnesota
New Jersey
New Mexico19
North Carolina
Ohio
Oregon
Tennessee
Washington
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